Abstract-Firewalls and detection systems have been used for preventing and detecting attacks by a wide variety of mechanisms. A problem has arisen where users and applications can circumvent security policies because of the particularities in the TCP/IP protocol, the ability to obfuscate the data payload, tunnel protocols, and covertly simulate a permitted communication. It has been shown that unusual traffic patterns may lead to discovery of covert channels. Presently, we are not aware of any schemes that address detecting anomalous traffic patterns that can potentially be created by a covert channel.
INTRODUCTION
CP/IP was not designed with security in mind and thus has very few security components by default. The protocols lack many features that are desirable or needed on an insecure network, such as authentication or encryption.
Our approach differs from the current academic research on this topic because it is industry-ready and being used with appreciable results in a very large production environment with a high-speed gigabit network. The approach has taken into account certain constraints in order to not possibly disrupt or degrade performance, a limitation that doesn't exist in the current academic theory and proof of concepts. While our approach has been successful, it requires constant refinement to detect improvements made to covert channels rendering them more difficult to detect. Is it expected that this trend will continue.
II. BACKGROUND

A.
Setting the stage In the corporate world, the common network security measure was to permit the communication, without any regards as to if the protocol semantics were followed or even the correct methods were used. When once a proxyapplication based firewalled was suitable, factors such as performance and protocol compatibility became a problem. With the advent of packet filtering we also inherited its drawbacks, one of which was not inspecting packets for protocol correctness.
B. Introduction -Early defence mechanisms
With the ability to inspect Layers 2 through 7 of the OSI model, Deep Packet Inspection seemed like a promising new method to identify and classify traffic based on signaturesbased comparisons, packet flows, heuristic, statistical, or anomaly-based techniques, or some combination of these. The idea was to move the inspection of the data in packets to the same application that does the packet filtering rather than have this task offloaded on another system. We believe this approach solved a few problems, but also created new ones; the approach was taking on too many tasks for it to be effective.
Application-layer firewalls work on the application layer of the TCP/IP stack and by the use of application proxies can easily filter traffic that doesn't match the expected protocol or port; they effectively are implementing a correctness check upon the application protocols they gateway. When the firewall is inspecting all packets for improper content, the task becomes rapidly complex given the variety of applications and the diversity of content that can be allowed in each sequence of packets. Add to this the resulting performance degradation and the various security flaws in the TCP/IP protocol itself and we have a difficult implementation in any environment.
The approach of a Protocol scrubber or "Traffic normalization" consists of an active interposition mechanism that attempts to homogenize network flows by identifying and T removing attacks in real-time. The difference in this approach is to continuously remove malicious content in the traffic flow by normalising protocol headers, padding and extensions as described by Malan et al. [1] , Handley et al. [2] and Fisk et al. [3] for the lifetime of the flow. This approach does have its merit, but has the same weakness as described for applicationfirewalls, namely network traffic disruption and degradation. The main weak point of this approach would be the handling of "non-well-behaved" clients which would have their flows tampered with and also suffer the corresponding packet loss given that the scrubber throws away any packets that could lead to inconsistencies [1] . It has been our experience that any tool that is actively interposing itself in a production environment, i.e. modifying traffic flows and subsequently breaking applications face a certain security vs. usability debate. We prefer to use a passive approach in an active production environment with unusual pattern detection techniques and anomalous network flows in mind.
C. Weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol
Security was not an integral part of the TCP/IP design process and it has been determined that many flaw and design weaknesses exist. A model of TCP/IP networks in regard to some well-known security threats is presented in [4] . This model characterizes the topology of TCP/IP security to enable a better understanding of the related vulnerabilities. A classic paper, [5] points out serious security flaws in the TCP/IP protocol suite with details on a variety of attacks.
D.
Payload tunnelling A tunnel acts as a relay point between two connections without changing the messages; tunnels are used when the communication needs to pass through an intermediary (such as a firewall) even when the intermediary cannot understand the contents of the messages. Various protocols exist that allow IP packets to be encapsulated inside protocols that run on top of IP. This encapsulation of protocols is known as tunnelling. These types of channels are especially useful to circumvent firewalls that limit outbound traffic to only a few select application protocols, a security problem that is quite present in corporate networks today.
E. Countermeasures and network security
In the production environments that we have examined, possible countermeasures include blocking unnecessary ports and protocols at network boundaries or at least limiting the destinations of particular permitted protocol and port.
An example would be to use egress filtering on the ICMP protocol, a common measure that is used to mostly prevent DoS type attacks originating from servers and clients inside the network. It also happens to prevent a particular type of covert channel as described by daemon9 with his tool Loki [6] .
Very few countermeasures exist for preventing covert channels on permitted protocols and ports, HTTP for example. This has led to many tools being available to circumvent security policies [7] and has also fueled different approaches on how to detect this problem.
F. Research on detection
Historically, three main detection approaches exist. The signature-based approach involves building and updating a signatures database and notifying the administrator when a known signature is found in the network data streams. The protocol-based approach focuses on protocol anomalies or violations and in case the monitored communications turn out to be "abnormal", the operator is notified. The behavior-based approach involves creating behavioral user profiles (users, workstations, servers, network streams, etc.) and using statistical methods to determine if the observed data stream is suspicious. Detecting covert channels are desirable to discourage the use of these channels and secondly, it is widely recognized that covert channels are impossible to eliminate entirely, even in highly optimized network protocols [8] . It is therefore crucial to monitor their activity. While there are known techniques for detecting covert channels in layer 3 and 4 protocols [9] , [10] , and [11] , very few exist for layer 7 channels.
In one approach, Schear et al. [12] proposed eliminating covert channels in HTTP responses by enforcing RFC protocol-compliant behavior and restricting usable response headers to a fixed set in a particular order, and by verifying response header fields against the corresponding object metadata and client request.
Sohn et al. [13] - [15] used a Support Vector Machine based approach to evaluate the accuracy of detecting covert channels embedded in ICMP echo packets and identification field of IP header and the sequence number field of TCP header. Techniques on data hiding in IP fields can be found here [16] . While our interest is detecting covert channels in the payload channel, Sohn et al. did achieved classification accuracies of up to 99 percent when training a classifier on normal and abnormal packets generated by Loki [6] .
Pack et al. proposed detecting HTTP tunnels by using behavior profiles of traffic flows [17] . This type of approach is independent from payload inspection and is based on social behavior of hosts by looking at their connection patterns [18] - [20] . Profiles are based on a number of metrics such as the average packet size, ratio of small and large packets, change of packet size patterns, total number of packets sent/received, and connection duration. If the behavior of a flow under observation deviates from the normal HTTP behavior profile it is likely to be an HTTP tunnel.
Borders et al. developed a tool for detecting covert channels over outbound HTTP tunnels based on a similar approach [21] . It analyses HTTP traffic over a training period, and is then able to detect abnormal HTTP flows using metrics such as request size, request regularity, time between requests, time of the day, and outbound bandwidth usage.
Hjelmvik et al. [22] developed a statistical protocol identification algorithm utilizing various statistical flow and application layer data features in order to identify application layer protocols by comparison of probability vectors to protocol models of known protocols. Although the results are preliminary, their approach is to use a hybrid technique, utilizing efficient generic attributes, which can include deep packet inspection elements and treating them the same way as statistical flow properties.
Cabuk et al. [23] - [25] investigated the detection of a class of network covert channels that use the timing of IP packets to transmit a secret message over the network. Their detection scheme used compressibility and showed that we were able to distinguish the covert channel traffic from WWW, FTP-Data, and SSH traffic with more than 95% detection rates. It was noted that more regular the data set, the higher the compressibility. Their results show that the compressibility scores for the SSH, WWW, and FTP-Data data sets are much less than IP simple covert channel compressibility scores.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In order to classify our proposed method, we have used the dual approach of knowledge -based for detecting specific anomalies and behavior-based intrusion detection for our covert channel profiling. It has been shown that unusual traffic patterns may lead to discovery of covert shells that employ packet headers. For example, multiple ping requests within a small time interval may indicate the presence of an ICMP covert shell such as Loki [6] . In addition, covert shells can be detected by observing an anomaly in unused packet header fields [2] . It is our opinion that combining anomaly detection and covert channel detection can enable us to ascertain a better qualification of those events.
The proposed method relies on the capability of examining network traffic with regular expressions and packet inspection logic to detect covert channels. The system also contains knowledge accumulated about TCP/IP weaknesses and unusual traffic patterns and can therefore look for attempts to exploit these weaknesses and raise an alarm if such attempts are made. Any action that is not explicitly recognized as anomalous , the system logs pending further offline investigation for potential covert activity whenever there is suspicion. This poses a problem of scalability that we discuss in Chapter 5. 
A. Preprocessor analysis
The proposed method relies on capturing link layer frames from the network and accumulates new packets. Using the TCP and IP preprocessors each IP and TCP packet is reassembled to avoid fragmentation attacks.
Analysis can now begin; the next step is to pass these packets through a series of preprocessors for each of the protocols starting by ARP, IP and TCP. A correctness check is then enabled by a series of more specialized preprocessors, each having a particular purpose that may generate alerts to indicate network's stated security policy violations.
B. Protocol profiling, sanitization and packet analysis
The second part of the preliminary analysis concerns particular protocol profiling and sanitization.
An http preprocessor translates escaped characters in HTTP requests into their equivalent so they can be searched by content filters; the same also applies to the telnet protocol. The RPC preprocessor reassembles fragmented RPC traffic so it can be searched by content filters.
The next step consists of packet analysis; we intend to use rules to filter by keywords by using a simple syntax to achieve our purpose. Covert channels on any of the following protocols (ftp, telnet, http, smtp) will be detected by a variety of metrics. 
C. Profiling characteristics
As an example, profiling characteristics of a telnet session for example would be comprised of a defined set of characters, small client-to-server packets and known RFC methods. The FTP protocol would also be composed of a defined set of characters, small client to server packets and a defined inactivity period. Here too the methods are known.
In general there are three classes of countermeasures: eliminating the covert channel, limiting the covert channel capacity and deterring potential users by demonstrating easy detection of the covert channel [26] .
In our proposed method, we intend to demonstrate detection with rules to filter by keywords and using a simple syntax to achieve our purpose. Eliminating the channel is impossible, and limiting the channel capacity could be an option once the channel is identified. A QoS mesure could be attributed to the network flow, but this study isn't in the scope of this paper.
Covert channels on any of the following protocols (ftp, telnet, http, smtp) will be detected by a variety of metrics. For example, a criterion for clear text protocols (not using any encryption) is the statistical distribution of characters that the protocol semantics demands.
Standard http traffic is composed of a series of methods (GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, CONNECT) and standard responses. Indications of non-rfc compliance and statistical deviations would indicate that the conversation may not in fact be HTTP, but a probable convert channel. In our tests, we have defined a lower limit threshold of eighty percent compliance to protocol RFC's to be reliable.
Our approach is similar to Schear et al. [12] but it isn't as intrusive and disruptive. While interesting, the approach is rather intrusive for it must act as a network bridge at the perimeter network. Interposing another device in a chain of proxies and firewalls that can affect traffic flow complicates thing considerably for large scale corporate networks, especially in terms of interoperability and performance. The vetting process is noteworthy, in that it prevents the transmission of data either overtly in the payload channel of layer 7 protocols such as HTTP or FTP or in hidden covert channels in the protocol channel of these protocols. Unfortunately, it is also impractical in that no data can be transferred if it hasn't be vetted; a condition that simply cannot be applied in existing corporate networks. Also, the approach towards verification of HTTPS by performing in-line decryption of all traffic raises particular privacy concerns for regular corporate employees. Our approach must be examined further for the HTTPS protocol and is a consideration for future work.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation is the creation of a passive monitoring tool named Syncd. It is a hybrid between a covert channel detection mechanism and an anomaly detector. By capturing link layer frames from the network, it provides the ability to detect known attacks via signatures, to collect statistics, to provide evidence of intrusion and to warn the security administrator in real time of any attack that might be violating the network security policy.
A. Network capture
Syncd can monitor a number of networks simultaneously and has an enhanced scripting language which permits system administrators to write rules to log suspicious activities and allow normal network traffic. Furthermore, packets can branch to secondary rulesets for further inspection after matching a particular rule. It can respond to a matching rule by stopping packets from being processed by the other rules, branching to another ruleset for further inspection, reassembling packets into a TCP stream, and, finally, doing nothing.
B. Embedded security features
Syncd can differentiate incoming traffic from outgoing traffic. This permits treating packets differently depending on if they come from the local network or not. Syncd has the possibility of reassembling TCP streams and detects many TCP stream reassembly evasion attempts. There are presently 17 types of unusual traffic patterns that may lead to the discovery of covert channels.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our approach, network traffic is tapped at the perimeter boundary, typically in line with the corporate firewall. The traffic can be recorded and processed at different levels of granularity, from complete packet-level traces to statistical figures. Compared to other approaches that use active capture [65] , only passive capture is used, since it is best suitable for analysis of Internet backbone traffic properties. Our passive traffic capture method is software-based and we have modified the Solaris operating system and device driver in order to obtain copies of network packets. This approach is inexpensive and offers good adaptability; we recognize that its possibilities to measure traffic on high speed networks are limited to 10 Gbit/s line speeds. A hardware-based method was examined, but determined to be rather costly and less versatile.
Once network data is collected, it is processed online or in 'real time' and also stored offline for non time critical events and suspicious network data. This offers the possibility to correlate network traffic collected at different times and different locations. Our passive traffic capture operates on different protocol layers, the Internet Protocol (IP), located on the network layer and transport layer protocols, especially TCP and UDP, and application layer protocols are our main focus.
Certain challenges that we faced in our approach is scalability. We realized that our packet capture and analysis was strictly limited by hardware performance, storage and processing capabilities, but we have taken steps to mitigate this problem. First, average backbone link throughput are far from line speed, and secondly, we are filtering only packets with specific properties. Another problem, is that routing symmetry on highly aggregated links is rare, which means that bi-directional flow data can no longer be assumed. We have yet to address this problem.
Our test setup consists of a sever running Solaris 10 with 8 core 1.2 GHz UltraSPARC T1 processors, 32 GB of memory, and gigabit Ethernet interfaces. The server is connected inline using a network tap, it is non-intrusive and can run continuously and provide results at any time scale. With this setup, we were able to scale to 3 Gbit/s without starting to drop packets and lessen our detection rate. This is the threshold we are considering the approximate maximum practical analysis rate for this hardware and this configuration and rulesets.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work presents a flexible and passive approach of profiling a multitude of covert TCP/IP channels. Specifically, the approach maintains client-server transparency because it passively captures link layer frames, thus not interfering with network throughput. The flexibility stems from the ability to be granular and use regular expression for many fields in the network flows. The approach consists of using covert channel detection schemes combined with anomalous network activity detection. We believe that this hybrid approach complements itself well and can be a basis for adding new and refined techniques in both the covert channel research area and the anomalous network activity area. Future work could include evaluating and integrating new HTTP preprocessors that use compression techniques [25] or the SPID algorithm [24] to detect covert HTTP more precisely and efficiently. New filters could be implemented that capture recent unusual network traffic patterns or detection evasion techniques.
We believe this approach will appeal to companies who are sensitive to these types of security incidents and are looking for a cost effective way to mitigate the risk of of certain covert channels.
